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An embodied and grounded perspective on concepts 
 
Abstract 
 
By the mainstream view in psychology and neuroscience, concepts are 
informational units, rather stable, and are represented in propositional format. 
In the view I will outline, instead, concepts correspond to patterns of activation 
of the perception, action and emotional systems which are typically activated 
when we interact with the entities they refer to. Starting from this embodied 
and grounded approach to concepts, I will focus on different research lines 
and present some experimental evidence concerning concepts of objects, 
concepts of actions, and abstract concepts. I will argue that, in order to  
account for abstract concepts, embodied and grounded theories should be 
extended.  
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An embodied and grounded perspective on concepts 
 
Concepts according to embodied and grounded views  
 
In the last years embodied and grounded (from now EG) theories have 
become more and more popular in a variety of disciplines, ranging from 
philosophy, to linguistics, to psychology, to cognitive science and 
neuroscience, to computer science and robotics (for a recent overview, see 
Borghi and Caruana, in press). There has been a marked increase in the 
publications on embodied cognition, as noticed by some scholars (e.g., 
Gentner, 2010), and some recent special issues testify how lively the field is 
(e.g., Borghi & Pecher, 2011)  and start to ask where research on 
embodiment is going (e.g., Davis & Markman, 2012; Dove, in press). Even if 
they can be quite different - for example, some of these theories assume the 
notion of representation, other don't think it is necessary -, these views share 
the idea that the cognitive processes cannot be studied without referring to 
the brain and to the body as control system. Furthermore, they propose that 
perception, action and cognition are deeply interconnected. This is in contrast 
with classical cognitive science views that posited a linear relationship 
between perception, cognition and action, implicitly assuming  that cognition 
can be intended as a sandwich, with perception and action considered as the 
external and less tasty slides compared to the tasty and crucial part of 
cognition (Hurley, 1998). 
 
From the idea of a strict link between perception, action and cognition derives 
the way in which EG views intend concepts, i.e. the minimal units of our 
knowledge on a given object or entity. Concepts would consist in the 
reactivation of the neural pattern activated during previous experience with 
the social and physical environment, aimed at facilitating the interaction with 
objects and entities which are present in the current situation/context 
(Barsalou, 1999; Borghi, 2005; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Prinz, 2002). For 
example, the concept of telephone would imply the multimodal activation 
(Gallese & Lakoff, 2005) of the acoustic, visual, tactile etc. properties and 
corresponding brain areas we typically experience and activate while seeing 
and using telephones  Specifically, Barsalou (1999), one of the most influent 
proponents of EG views, argued, "In this theory, a concept is equivalent to a 
simulator. It is the knowledge and accompanying processes that allow an 
individual to represent some kind of entity or event adequately. A given 
simulator can produce limitless simulations…Whereas a concept represents a 
kind generally, a conceptualization provides one specific way of thinking about 
it."(Barsalou, 1999, p. 587).  
The chapter will focus on concepts as simulators. We will discuss of concepts 
of objects and of actions; then we will turn to how concepts of objects and 
actions are mediated by language; finally, we will briefly discuss of the so-
called "abstract concepts". 
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Simulation 
 
The notion of simulation is complicated and controversial: as there are many 
embodied theories, there are also many views of simulation (for discussion, 
see Borghi & Cimatti, 2010; Gallese, 2009;Jeannerod, 2006; Decety & 
Grezes, 2006). Here we will intend simulation as composed by two aspects: 
reenactment and prediction. Simulating would mean reactivating offline the 
same neural network used while perceiving and interacting with objects and 
entities, and while experiencing emotions. Simulating has a predictive 
function, as it prepares us to interact with the objects and entities which are 
present in the current context/situation. We simulate when we perceive 
objects: for example, seeing an apple activates a grasping action, and it also 
pre-activates our gustatory and olfaction system. We simulate when we 
perceive others performing an action, and this action is part of our motor 
repertoire: for example, if we observe and hear a dog barking, we cannot 
simulate, since we cannot bark (Buccino et al., 2004). Since grasping objects 
is part of our motor abilities, we simulate when we observe monkeys grasping 
an object. Finally, we simulate when we comprehend language: for example, 
when hearing the sentence "he kicked the ball" we internally reproduce the 
situation described by the sentence, activating our legs. It is an open issue 
whether we simulate also when we understand abstract words, such as 
"truth". The neural basis of this simulation has likely to be found in the 
activation of the canonical and mirror neuron systems, i.e. of the systems 
activated while observing objects and people interacting with them (for 
reviews, see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Gallese, 2008). How does this 
simulation work during language comprehension? As an example, the Action 
Based Language model (Glenberg & Gallese, 2012), emphasizes the 
predictive aspects of the simulation we form during language comprehension.  
For example, upon hearing the verb “kick”, the mirror neuron system would be 
activated and possible outcomes of the action to perform would be generated. 
In the following part of the paper we will describe experiments performed in 
our lab which help exemplify how simulation occurs.  
 
Simulating during object observation: affordances 
 
Affordances are an important notion for EG theories, as they provide a bridge 
between perception and action. With affordance Gibson (1979) originally 
referred to the fact that the environment offers to us invitations to act: for 
example, a pen invites us to hold it. The notion of affordance has had a lot of 
success within psychology and cognitive neuroscience, at least as an 
inspiration source. In particular, Ellis and Tucker (2000) have proposed to use 
the notion of microaffordance, to indicate the similarities but also the 
differences between their own and Gibson's view. Microaffordances are rather 
specific and pertain components of actions, for example grasping and 
reaching affordances. Furthermore, activating the microaffordances of a given 
object, e.g. a cup, implies having recognized it. Finally, the authors proposing 
the notion of microaffordance are interested also in how they are represented 
in the brain, as the product of visuomotor associations developed through 
experience. This interest for the neural correlates of affordances (for a recent 
review see Maranesi et al., in press) was not present in Gibson's view.  
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Until some years ago the majority of studies focused on how affordances 
were activated, independently from the task. For example, in some elegant 
experiments Tucker and Ellis (1998; 2001) asked participants to categorize 
objects into natural objects and artifacts mimicking either a precision or a 
power grip, and found a compatibility effect between the object size and the 
grip to execute to respond: larger objects' category was determined faster and 
more accurately executing a power grip, while the opposite was true for 
smaller objects' category. The result of this study indicate that, even if the task 
- a categorization one - did not require access to objects size, 
microaffordances related to grasping were automatically activated. Very 
recent studies on affordances tend to highlight, rather than their automaticity, 
their flexibility and contextual dependency (e.g., van Elk et al., 2014; for an 
overview of recent work in our lab see Borghi, 2014). For example, Borghi et 
al. (2012) presented participants with objects and with a hand. The objects 
could be either linked by a spatial relation (objects typically located in the 
same context, e.g., knife-butter) or by a functional relation (objects typically 
used together, e.g. knife-coffee-mug), or by no relation. The hand could be 
displayed while grasping the object in order to move/manipulate it, in order to 
use it, or it could simply be near the object. In one condition no hand was 
present. Participants were required to press two different keys on the 
keyboard to determine whether the two objects were related or not. When the 
objects were functionally related manipulation posture were the slowest, while 
when the objects were spatially related functional postures were inhibited.  
This interaction was not present when participants were required to perform 
foot responses, by pressing a pedal. This suggests that observing hands in 
potential interaction with objects activates affordances, that differ depending 
on the context. Furthermore, the results indicate that observing a hand in 
potential interaction with an object elicits a motor simulation, which is specific 
for a given effector (here the hand, not the foot).  
A further study (Scorolli et al., in press) investigates the role of the social 
context in affordance activation. We had again pairs of objects linked by a 
spatial relation (e.g., can-knife), by different kinds of functional relations or by 
no relation. The functional relations could either imply an individual action 
(functional–individual: e.g., can-straw) or an action to perform with somebody 
else (functional–cooperative: e.g., can-glass). Participants were asked to 
refrain from responding when the two objects were not related; when they 
were related they had either to move toward the experimenter, as if to give 
something to him (giving condition) or to move away from him, as when taking 
something for themselves (getting condition). We also manipulated the 
presence or not of eye gaze communication. Results revealed that 
participants were sensitive to the information given by the hand posture and 
by the eye gaze: responses were faster when the other was engaged in 
individual rather than in cooperative actions, and when the other used a 
manipulative  hand posture, more open to cooperation, than a functional hand 
posture, used for individual actions. This study clearly shows how  
affordances are deeply modulated by the social and the physical context, and 
indicates that we possess a precise and sophisticated ability to predict others' 
actions, as well as their social vs. individual character.  
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We briefly reported these studies to show how initial work on affordances was 
focused on single objects, while now it becomes more important to show the 
effects of the physical context (see also Kalenine et al., in press), or of the 
social context (see also Ellis et al., 2013) on their activation.  
 
 
Simulating during action observations - motor resonance 
 
In the last years a number of studies have revealed the existence of motor 
resonance processes (e.g. Aglioti et al, 2008). Our mirror neuron system 
would respond more when we observe others performing actions that are part 
of our motor repertoire, compared to actions we are not able to perform. In the 
last years the literature has gone even further, revealing the existence of 
motor resonant processes when we observe others similar to us - for example 
sharing our culture, or our ideology.  
In our lab we have performed some studies showing motor resonance 
processes when we observe actions of people whose bodily characteristics 
are similar to our own. Liuzza et al. (2010) have demonstrated this with a 
priming paradigm. Children were shown pictures of adults hands and children 
hands in a grasping posture or in a control posture (fist) followed by images of 
light vs. heavy objects (e.g., a block notes vs. a dictionary). They had to 
decide whether the target-objects they saw were light or heavy pressing a 
different key on a keyboard. We found that response times were faster when 
children observed children hands in a grasping posture compared to when 
they observed adults hands and children hands in a control posture. These 
results suggest that children simulate the action of lifting the object, thus their 
response times differ depending on the object's weight. More crucially, they 
resonate more when they observe hands similar to their own, as adults 
possess a completely different body schema. Ranzini et al. (2011) provided 
evidence of motor resonance processes with a line bisection paradigm, in 
which participants were required to bisect a line with two flankers. In one 
experiment the flankers consisted in the images of a hand displaying a 
precision vs. a power grip; they flanked a line which could be thin or thick. We 
found that people tended to bisect a line more toward the precision grip 
flanker when the line was thin, more toward the power grip flanker when the 
line was thick. This suggests that we are sensitive to the affordances provided 
by the line in combination with the action evoked by the hand posture. In 
further experiments we found an effect of motor resonance: participants 
tended to bisect the line more toward the precision grip, as if preparing 
themselves for a skilled action, such as  the kind of action which is typically 
associated to a precision posture. Finally, the effect was modulated by motor 
resonance: it was stronger with human hands than with fake hands or with 
robotics hands. Further motor resonance processes were observed during 
observation of a hand grasping dangerous objects. In a recent study (Anelli et 
al., 2013) adults and children observed human and robotics hands of their 
own/a different gender followed by graspable neutral and dangerous objects 
(e.g., tomato vs. cactus). neutral graspable objects produced a facilitation of 
the motor response, while dangerous objects inhibited the response, probably 
due to an aversive effect. Both children and adults responded faster to human 
than to robotics hands, revealing a motor resonant mechanism.  Specific 
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resonant mechanisms related to the gender of the hand emerged instead only 
in adults.  
Overall, these studies show stronger motor resonance processes when we 
observe actions performed by someone possessing a body similar to ours, in 
terms of body schema (children vs. adults), of gender, of body parts (hands).  
 
Simulating during language comprehension 
 
What happens when concepts are expressed through words? We simulate 
the processes described by means of linguistic expressions (Barsalou, 2008; 
Borghi & Cangelosi, in press; Gallese, 2008; Glenberg and Gallese, 2013).  
Many studies in various labs, and in our lab as well, have demonstrated that 
this simulation is fine-grained: it is sensitive to object characteristics such as 
object shape, orientation, weight (Scorolli et al., 2009), as well as to 
characteristics of actions, as the effectors (hands, mouth or feet) used to 
perform them: for example, the arm/hand is activated while reading or hearing 
throw a ball, the foot while reading or hearing kick a ball (for an overview of 
the studies of our lab see Borghi, 2012). We recently demonstrated that the 
simulation differs when we read sentences referring to a different social 
context, such as "give the object to a friend vs. to an enemy" (Lugli et al., 
2012).  In a recent kinematics work (Gianelli et al., 2013), we investigated how 
the simulation of a social situation formed during language comprehension 
was modulated by a real social situation. Participants were required to 
evaluate whether sentences made sense or not by moving the mouse away or 
toward their own body. The sentences referred to objects characterized by 
positive or negative valence to bring or to give to someone else  (e.g., “The 
object is ugly/smooth. Bring it to you/Give it to another person”). In one 
condition participants performed the task individually, in another an 
experimenter observed the performance, and in a further condition the 
experimenter interacted with participants relocating the mouse where they 
had left it. The simulation formed during the comprehension of the social 
context illustrated in the sentences was enhanced by matching it with the real 
social context given by the presence of the experimenter. Specifically, we 
found an increase in accuracy and a slowing down of RTs when the sentence 
stimuli referred to the "another person" target and the experimenter acted as a 
confederate. This is consistent with kinematics data showing that, in social 
situations, responses become slower to allow for an increase in accuracy 
(e.g., Ferri et al., 2010). Our results thus suggest that the simulation formed is 
sensitive both to the fictitious (linguistically expressed) and to the real social 
context.  
 
Abstract concepts  
 
We have discussed so far of concepts of objects and of actions, as well as of 
concepts mediated by words. The notion of simulation can be applied in a 
rather straightforward way to concrete concepts, but it is much more 
complicated to defend the view that abstract concepts, such as "phantasy" 
and "truth", activate simulations. We have recently proposed the Words As 
social Tools (WAT) view on abstract concepts, and have collected some 
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evidence supporting it (Borghi & Cimatti, 2009; Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; see 
also Borghi, 2013). According to traditional views, abstract concepts are 
represented solely on the basis of linguistic information: while concrete 
concepts and words such as "book" would activate visual information, this 
would not be the case for abstract words (e.g., Paivio, 1986). According to 
standard embodied views, abstract concepts as well would activate 
sensorimotor experience, hence simulations: for example, the concept of 
justice would reactivate the experience of a tribunal (for a review, see Pecher 
et al., 2011). Our view is an EG view, hence it proposes that abstract 
concepts are activate the perception, action and emotional systems. At the 
same time, however, we maintain that this is not the whole story, and that to 
fully account for abstract concepts representation EG views need to be 
extended. We propose indeed that not only sensorimotor, but also linguistic 
experience plays a major role in the acquisition and representation of abstract 
concepts. In our view, the modality of acquisition of concrete and abstract 
concepts profoundly differs, and this influences their neural representation. To 
form concrete categories such as those of dogs or chairs, the influence of 
language is certainly of importance, but not crucial, since the category 
members share many perceptual similarities. To form abstract categories, 
instead, hearing a common label that keeps together sparse and different 
experience, or hearing someone explaining to us the meaning of a given 
words, might be crucial. We therefore predict that for both concrete and 
abstract concepts sensorimotor and linguistic experience count, but that their 
distribution differs, since for abstract concepts linguistic information would be 
more relevant. Importantly, we speak of linguistic “experience”. We do not 
intend to deny the role of distributional statistical information for word meaning 
(see distributional views, according to which meaning of a word is given by its 
cooccurrence with other words, for an influent example see Landauer & 
Dumais, 2007). However, we do not with limit the contribution of language to 
this; rather, with linguistic “experience” we intend the whole social and 
emotional experience of being taught a word by somebody in a context, and 
of starting to use it to refer to a particular object, event, situation, event.   
We have collected some evidence in support of this view. In two acquisition 
studies with adults (Borghi et al., 2011; Granito et al., in preparation) we have 
demonstrated that learning a novel label and receiving a meaning explanation 
facilitates more the acquisition of novel abstract than of concrete words, and 
that it leads to an activation of the mouth. Novel abstract words lead to faster 
responses with the mouth (using a microphone), while novel concrete words 
evoke faster manual responses. The result is further supported by ratings we 
obtained on a subset of abstract words (from the database of Barca et al., 
2002). Participants were asked to rate to what extent an effector (hand or 
mouth) is involved in a possible action with the item. We found that, while the 
hand was preferentially activated for concrete words, both the hand and the 
mouth were activated with abstract words. This suggests that activation of the 
mouth underscores abstract concepts representation, be it due to the 
enhancement of past linguistic comprehension or linguistic production 
experiences (see Borghi & Binkofski, 2014, for a detailed discussion). Further 
work on the neural basis of abstract concept representation supports this 
view: in a TMS study (Scorolli et al., 2012) we found that, compared to 
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phrases with a concrete verb (e.g., to grasp a flower/a concept), phrases with 
an abstract verb (e.g., to describe a flower/a concept) implied a late activation 
of  the motor manual system, probably due to the fact that they activated first 
the mouth, and that this lead to a cascade activation of the hand. 
Furthermore, in an fMRI study (Sakreida et al, 2012) we found that 
sensorimotor networks in the brain are activated by both concrete and 
abstract phrases, while linguistic networks are activated mainly by abstract 
ones. Finally, in a recent study on Italian sign language (LIS) we found and 
illustrated examples of signs used to express abstract concepts (e.g. 
linguistics, truth) that exploit linguistic information, taken either from the same 
sign language or from a different language, be it spoken or signed (Borghi, 
Capirci, Gianfreda and Volterra, under review). Overall, the evidence 
described supports the WAT proposal on abstract concepts. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Concepts reactivate past experiences, to help us deal with current 
experiences. The chapter presents an EG view of concepts and overviews 
recent evidence supporting it.  
The view that concepts of objects and of actions are grounded in 
sensorimotor system and evoke a simulation is supported by much evidence. 
Accounting for abstract concepts, instead, represents a major challenge for 
the future of EG cognition, not easy to deal with. We have recently proposed 
that, to explain abstract concepts representation, not only sensorimotor 
experiences should be taken into account, but also linguistic experiences, 
considered in their social and emotional complexity. Further research is 
needed to address this fascinating challenge. 
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